REINVENTING HUMAN SERVICES IN AMERICA
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David Stoesz

Passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
(PRWOA) of 1996661 presents an opportunity to reinvent human services
in America. For more than a decade, the welfare bureaucracy and public
assistance programs of state welfare have been in crisis. The clients who
depend on welfare detest it, finding and keeping qualified professionals to
work in the public social services has become an administrative headache,
and taxpayers perceive welfare as a fiscal black hole that perpetuates
immorality. The recent decision to "devolve" welfare in a block grant to
states underscores the urgency to rethink public assistance to poor
families. There is good reason to be concerned about the social
consequences of devolution and the replacement of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) with Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). However, this transformation of welfare also presents
an important opportunity to replace inferior benefits and services provided
through an antiquated welfare bureaucracy with a new infrastructure for
human services. This monograph illustrates how human services can be
reinvented, using Virginia as a prototype.
Recent evidence underscores the inadequacy of the traditional public
welfare approach to poverty. While 14.5 percent of American families
were in poverty in 1994, the traditional welfare programs that support
many have eroded.662 For 1996, the maximum monthly AFDC grant for a
family of three was $389, only 36 percent of the poverty level. When
Food Stamps were added, the grant increased to $699, only 65 percent of
the poverty level.663 Even such low benefit levels fail to reflect the
deterioration of AFDC benefits over time due to the fact that AFDC is not
indexed for inflation. Between 1970 and 1996, AFDC benefits lost 51
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percent of their value.664 Today's AFDC parent, in other words, is trying to
maintain a family on less than one-half the amount available to a
comparable parent a generation ago.
Eroding benefits reflect a program that has come under increasing
scrutiny. During the 1960's and 1970's, the Left criticized public
assistance as an inadequate program designed to keep the minority poor in
a subordinate role in American culture. 66 5 During the 1980's, the Right
scored public welfare as an unconditional entitlement that induced the
poor to become dependent on governmental aid.6 66 By the early 1990's,
defenders of governmental welfare programs were having difficulty
demonstrating unequivocal public support for them. 667 Using waivers
granted by the federal government, states experimented with making
receipt of AFDC conditional on a variety of behaviors: parents'
participation in welfare-to-work programs, children's school attendance,
and family planning, among others. 668 Many of the conditions introduced
in various state waivers were incorporated in Virginia's welfare reform,
initially the Virginia Independent Program (VIP), and later the Virginia
66 9
Initiative for Employment Not Welfare (VIEW).
Voter ambivalence about welfare soon became grist for presidential
politics. As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton credited much of his
election to his promise to "end welfare as we know it."670 Yet, instead of
presenting a proposal to a Democratic 103rd Congress, he procrastinated.
The 1994 election, which gave Republicans control of Congress, pushed
welfare reform further up on the domestic agenda as well as to the right.
By late 1995, Clinton stated a preference for the Senate version of welfare
reform which was less Draconian than that passed by the House. In so
doing, he signaled his willingness to transfer AFDC to the states in the
form of a block grant.67 1 On August 22, 1996, the President signed
PRWOA, a Republican-crafted welfare reform proposal that terminated a
672
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Block grants and devolution of public assistance to the states via
PRWOA represents the most fundamental change in public welfare in
more than a half-century. Many advocates of social justice fear that
devolution will spark competition among states to reduce benefits,
instigating a "race to the bottom." 673 Of particular concern is the fate of
the significant minority of families--perhaps 20 percent of those currently
receiving AFDC--who are unlikely to make the transition from welfare to
work.6 7 4 The combination of inflexible work requirements and arbitrary
time limits could mean that thousands of poor children would be
terminated from public assistance in Virginia. 675 It is for this reason that
the reinvention of human services is an urgent matter. The failure to
address the modest earnings of welfare families with working parents
presents a troubling scenario because even if a significant majority of
AFDC parents find work, their earnings alone will not make them
financially independent of welfare. Limiting the period of receipt for
benefits will delete a large number of families from welfare roles,
effectively consigning thousands of children to a marginal existence in the
underclass. Moreover, a disproportionate number of children 676
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A more humane response to static earnings of poor working families
would be to accelerate their upward mobility so that they would not have
to resort to welfare in the future. Accordingly, this monograph proposes a
human capital investment strategy for Virginians living in poverty. This
strategy is articulated through four themes: rewarding actions designed to
achieve economic self-sufficiency, experimenting through privatization,
empowering consumers and communities, and respecting the cultural
diversity of the Commonwealth.677 These themes contrast with those
which have guided public welfare for the past half-century: benefits as
unconditional entitlements, provision of service through the public sector,
a subordinate role of clients in relation to professionals and programs, and
uniform procedures and benefits regardless of the heterogeneity of
program beneficiaries.
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SPIRIT IS

I. THE VIRGINIA INVESTMENT ACT

Human services can be reinvented through a Virginia Investment Act
(VIA), drafted in accord with the human capital investment themes noted
above. Because of the multiple facets of an overhaul of public welfare,
VIA is articulated in four titles that delineate specific program
components.
Title I: Virginia Individual Development Accounts (VIDA's)--Based on
Individual Development Accounts, VIDA's would be tax-exempt accounts
that could be used for four purposes: finishing college or vocational
school, purchasing a home, establishing a business, or supplementing a
pension.6 7 8 Individual's contributions to a VIDA would be matched by
funds from the Virginia Development Fund (see Title IV) according to the
income of the account holder. For example, contributions to VIDA's held
by Virginians who are below the poverty line might be three dollars
contributed by the Fund for every dollar deposited by an individual, while
those for the working poor might be two dollars from the Fund for every
two dollars from an individual. More affluent VIDA holders would have
to contribute three dollars for every one dollar contributed by the Fund.
When operational, a VIDA program would require a much more carefully
calibrated contribution format.
A VIDA approach to human services has several advantages.
Foremost, it helps the poor accumulate assets, the most effective strategy
for leveraging people out of poverty. Second, it would be a universal
program, available to all Virginians, thus extending its political base.
Third, benefits accrue only when individuals make deposits in their
accounts; people who fail to make deposits even under very favorable
matching formulas will not gain, while those who maximize their VIDA's
will benefit more. Finally, since VIDA's would require deposits in
advance of paying benefits, the program would accumulate capital that
could be used for community development projects.
A VIDA program would complement the earnestness of the minority
poor, the majority of whom persist in working despite low wages. Many
ethnic communities have found the key to prosperity has not been public
welfare programs--helpful though these may be during emergencies--but
in family solidarity, hard work, and thrift. A VIDA initiative would
formalize and reinforce the way in which the market and society have
rewarded such mainstream behavior. To date, the development account
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concept is being piloted in several states and localities. 679 Significantly,
PRWOA contains a specific provision for VIDA's, although no funding is
included.
Title II: Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI's)-Community development financial institutions would be established to
provide asset management consultation for the poor. Of the CDFI's that
have been developed to assist poor communities, three forms have
emerged: Community Development Banks (CDB's), Community
Development Credit Unions (CDCU's), and Community Development
Corporations (CDC's). Under VIA, communities would able to select the
CDFI that would be most meet their particular needs. As CDFI's, each
would be expected to offer services designed to minimize the budget
emergencies that typically leave many poor families reliant on public
assistance, provide financial education services so that account-holders
could optimize their VIDA's, and use institutional assets to leverage
community development activities. For example, a CDFI could stabilize
income fluctuations that typify poverty by assigning account managers
who would encourage poor workers to obtain Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) refunds as supplements to their paychecks rather than as a lump
sum.
Regarding asset building, account managers could encourage members
to deposit their EITC refunds in VIDA accounts. With respect to
community development, CDFI's could use Electronic Benefit Transfer
(EBT), encouraging members to direct deposit public benefits, the
reserves of which could then be used to leverage projects to enhance
neighborhood physical and social infrastructure. Thus, CDFI's would
educate members in short-term financial management by offering savings
and checking services, as well as long-term financial planning through
VIDA's.
CDFI's would assume responsibility for the Income Maintenance
function presently provided through Departments of Social Services. 680 A
reasonable method for financing CDFI's would be through direct deposit
of public assistance benefits. Tens of millions of dollars are dispensed by
federal and state agencies monthly, benefits that could be used to
capitalize development projects. Additional sources of revenue could be
obtained by soliciting commercial banks to deposit funds in CDFI's in
679
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order to meet their Community Reinvestment Act obligations, 68 1 as well
as encouraging nonprofit agencies to establish accounts in CDFI's as a
way to invest directly in community development. As a condition of being
granted direct deposit privileges, the Commonwealth would require that
CDFI's offer a basic package of financial services, including basic account
management, income tax preparation in order to optimize EITC refunds,
counseling toward home ownership, monitoring child support as well as
eligibility for training and education benefits, and long-range financial
planning.
While many, perhaps most, of the enrollees of CDFI's would initially
be AFDC recipients, financial services would be available to all.
Consumers could select among competing CDFI's for benefits and
services. With the assistance of account managers, CDFI members would
develop individualized plans designed to broker income benefits and
optimize training and educational benefits for the purpose of achieving
economic self-sufficiency. Account managers would also function as
consumer advocates, making referrals to other resources as appropriate.
Private sector financial institutions have already shown interest in
providing services to the welfare poor. New Mexico, for example, has
converted from the traditional form of AFDC checks and Food Stamp
coupons to EBT, both of which are contracted out to a commercial bank in
the larger metropolitan counties. 6 82 Chicago's South Shore Bank illustrates
how a CDB can provide financial services that complement community
development in poor neighborhoods. 683 The Central Brooklyn Federal
Credit Union, a CDCU, has enrolled 5,200 members, accrued $5.2 million
in assets, and made loans exceeding $3 million since its inception in
1989.684
Properly structured, CDFI's could be engines for community
development. A good illustration of how CDFI's could facilitate economic
activity in poor communities is the concept of micro-enterprise, with small
loans to entrepreneurs to establish small businesses. 68 5 Not only has
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micro-enterprise been shown to be useful in helping AFDC recipients
achieve economic independence, 686 but the economic capacity of the
community has benefited as well. This has been demonstrated by the
micro-enterprise initiative sponsored by the Mott Foundation. 6 87 By 1989,
the Foundation had capitalized 19 programs which represented assets of
$16 million. Institutions making loans for micro-enterprise were able to
leverage $16 for every $1 invested by Mott. Average wages paid to
employees of new businesses were approximately 50 percent above the
minimum wage. 688 By 1992, the Aspen Institute catalogued 108 microenterprises in the U.S. 689 Among the most innovative of micro-enterprises
is Cooperative Home Care Associates (CHCA), a worker-owned, home
health agency in New York City that has employed many former-AFDC
recipients. 69 A more ambitious venture is Reach, Inc., a $20 million
network of nonprofit enterprises in Mississippi and Alabama operated by
African Americans, many of whom had been dependent on public
assistance. 69 1 Iowa's Institute for Social and Economic Development
(ISED) has helped 138 poor people to establish their own businesses, of
whom 122 had been on AFDC. By 1992, ISED had leveraged 40 of these
entrepreneurs off of AFDC altogether. 692 In San Francisco, the Women's
Initiative for Self Employment (WISE) has helped 3,500 women learn
about entrepreneurship
and started more than 500 businesses through
6 93
enterprise.
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Title III: Children's Services Authority (CSA)--The categorical
programs to children and families managed by local Departments of
Social Services, Health Departments, and Departments of Juvenile
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Services should be consolidated under a CSA.6 94 As a quasi-governmental
entity, the CSA would be overseen by a board of directors that hires an
executive director who employs a management staff. Direct services to
families and children would be contracted out to private providers.
Functional areas of oversight would include pre-natal and maternity care,
Head Start and other pre-school programs, parenting classes and child day
care, child and family therapy, as well as culture and recreation. In order
to facilitate collaboration among providers while assuring quality and
accountable services, the CSA would have the authority
to award
695
contracts and evaluate the performance of private providers.
The CSA would use its revenues to induce private providers to
conform to a model of school-based social services which would include
as a minimum child day care, child protection, maternal and child health
care, family preservation, and culture and recreation services. CSA
revenues could not be used to supplant existing revenues from traditional
sources, such as fees or the United Way. As a condition to receipt of CSA
revenues, contracting agencies would agree to implement a client
satisfaction instrument, provide data on cost per unit of service, and open
their management information systems to the CSA on request. CSA
funding to contract agencies would be performance based.
School-based social services would be designated as "Family Resource
Centers." 696 As a school-based facility, each Family Resource Center
would provide basic services to a designated neighborhood. The
development of a generic intake form would allow access to multiple
programs, at the same time providing the database needed for the CSA to
deploy resources to meet demand. Budget allocations by the CSA to
service providers would be contingent on achieving predefined targets.
The most complete model of a CSA is the Chatham-Savannah Youth
Futures Authority in Georgia. A legislatively designated nonprofit agency,
the Youth Futures Authority has overseen a collaborative process for child
and family services providers since 1987. 697 Since that time, dozens of
service agencies have joined the collaboration, community-based Family
694 For an illustration of a such an authority, see the final chapter in LELA COSTIN,
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Resource Centers have evolved, and a five-year plan has been instituted.
Positive program outcomes were achieved with regard to several
important indicators, including incidence of low birth-weight infants, the
percentage of confirmed cases of child abuse (although the number of
reports increased), the number of children over age for school grade for all
race and gender groups, school suspensions, teen pregnancy and births,
number8 of interventions on the part of children's services and the juvenile
9
6

court.

Title IV: Virginia Development Fund (VDF)--Funding for the Virginia
Investment Act would be through the creation of a Virginia Development
Fund, the financing of which would evolve. During the first phase, the
initiative would be tested through a demonstration project and funding
requirements would be relatively small. Funding during the demonstration
phase would be derived primarily from philanthropic sources,
supplementing these with public funds when possible.
Full financing of VIA would require general revenues. Two
approaches might be taken with regard to general revenues: a minimalist
strategy and one more structural. With respect to the former, a logical
candidate for the VDF is gaming revenues. Ear-marking a portion of the
state lottery for the VDF is justifiable because the poor disproportionately
play the lottery, despite the odds against winning. A measure of lack of
perceived opportunity for the poor in Virginia are the odds against
winning the big payoff for the state lottery: the odds against winning are
more remote than there are people living in the Commonwealth. In
addition, lottery tickets could be imprinted with "A Better Bet" notice,
stating the availability of VIDA's.
More substantial funding could be obtained by addressing the
structural inequality of public expenditures in Virginia. On almost every
indicator, the taxes and expenditures of the Commonwealth are far below
those of other states. Virginia ranks 49th with regard to federal and state
general revenues, which account for only 15.9 percent of Virginians'
personal income (compared to the U.S. average of 19.0 percent).699
Limiting general revenues to those generated by the Commonwealth,
Virginia ranks 45th, with general revenues registering at 13.7 percent of
income (compared to the U.S. average of 15.5 percent).70 0 Of all tax
revenues, Virginia ranks 44th, with such revenues accounting for 9.5
percent of income (compared to the U.S. average of 10.8 percent).70 '
698
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On the expenditure side of the ledger, Virginia allocates relatively less
than other states in human capital investments. For example, in general
expenditures, the Commonwealth ranks 48th, with 15.8 percent of
personal income so allocated (compared the U.S. average of 19.0
percent).70 3 In direct elementary and secondary education funding,
Virginia ranks 41st, allocating 4.1 percent of personal income (compared
to 4.5 percent as the U.S. average).70 4 In funding for public welfare,
Virginia ranks 49th, spending 1.7 percent of personal income (compared
to the U.S. average of 3.0 percent).70 5
Recognizing that overtaxing and excessive spending can disadvantage
the Commonwealth vis-a-vis its competitive advantage with other states,
the rankings above suggest that Virginia is far from such a threshold. To
the contrary, comparative data indicate that Virginia has been under
investing in human capital, particularly in regard to education and welfare.
Moreover, the inadequacy of Commonwealth funding for the poor is even
more acute given the devolution of welfare to the states through welfare
reform.
In the event of recession, Virginia will be hard-pressed to continue its
welfare effort since federal appropriations have been capped at 1994
expenditure levels.70 6 Furthermore, persistent under-funding of basic
human services presents a fiscal hazard to local government. Lacking
protection against insecurity, it is likely that the poor will resort to
aberrant behavior, the control of which entails program costs shouldered
disproportionately by local government. On the bases of investing in
human capital as well as avoiding future costs, modest increases of taxes
are justified.
In fully funding the Virginia Investment Initiative, revenues generated
from modest tax increases would be diverted to a special revenue pool, the
VDF. The VDF could be funded through incremental adjustments in
existing taxes or through more substantive changes in revenue policy. One
candidate would be a progressive consumption tax, exempting savings and
investments.70 7 Another would be the institution of a Commonwealth
value-added tax (VAT) that exempts food, medical care, and housing.
Currently, two states have VAT's, as have all 12 nations of the European
702Id., at 188.
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704
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Economic Community. 70 8 Either a progressive consumption tax or a VAT
that exempts essential commodities would divert substantial sums to the
VDF.

II. A NEW PROTOTYPE
Passage of PRWOA is an opportunity for states to put in place a new
template for human services. Unfortunately, many human service
professionals who oversee welfare continue to react defensively to
conservative insistence to restructure the welfare state. For human service
professionals, the devolution of welfare to states as a block grant
represents the most significant reversal in social policy since the passage
of the Social Security Act in 1935. Following the Family Support Act of
1988, which was a clear reflection of the Reagan White House, welfare
devolution is an unprecedented policy triumph for conservatives. Yet,
state experiments with welfare-to-work programs and current research in
the economic prospects of AFDC recipients indicate that minimalist
responses to the circumstances of poor families will not be adequate to
boost them out of poverty. Assessments of more than a dozen welfare-towork programs conducted by the Manpower Demonstration Research
Corporation (MDRC) indicate that increased earnings of program
participants are small and that the prospect of recovering the costs of
mounting a welfare-to-work program through reduced welfare
expenditures is problematic. 70 9 David Ellwood, one of the Clinton
administration's leaders in welfare reform, summarized the experience of
welfare-to-work experiments, concluding that the typical participant
reported increased income of from $200 to $750 per year,71 0 hardly
enough to make them economically independent of AFDC.
Research by the Institute for Women's Policy Research (IWPR) shows
that, by a sizable majority, mothers on AFDC have participated in, or are
seeking entrance to, the labor force. IWPR researchers divide the AFDC
population into six groups:
1. 22.8 percent are cyclers, alternating between work and welfare
as economic circumstances demand,
2. 20.1 percent are combiners, coupling welfare benefits with
work that fails to pay enough to get them off of public
assistance,
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23.4 percent are job-seekers, dependent on AFDC but actively
looking for work
4. 7.4 percent are lookingfor limited hours to work, but continue
to depend on welfare,
5. 19.7 percent are out of the laborforce, and reliant on AFDC,
and
6. 6.6 percent are exempt from work because of a disability, and
reliant on AFDC.7 1 '
IWPR research suggests that the AFDC population is heterogeneous with
regard to candidacy for employment, and that only about
one in four have
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The challenge is to convert welfare-to-work programs that offer
welfare recipients marginal improvements in earnings into opportunities
that accelerate their upward mobility and vault them out of poverty. In
order to do so, it is essential to encourage asset formation among the poor,
to restructure programs for children and families, to capture capital in poor
neighborhoods for their revitalization, and to develop alternative methods
for financing the remediation of poverty. Such a challenge is not
unprecedented. Prior to the New Deal and the Great Society, advocates of
social justice faced daunting circumstances, yet prevailed--a determined
few marshaled scanty resources to forge programs such as Social Security,
Medicare, and Head Start. The adversity of recent decades is not unlike
that encountered by human service pioneers who responded with grit and
determination. In truth, all that stands between us and the next generation
of programs for the poor may be little more than a poverty of imagination.
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